By the Finapolis Research Desk. Data as of June 11, 2026, 14:16 ET.
A discounted cash flow (DCF) model estimates what a business is worth by projecting the cash it will generate and converting that future cash into a value in today's dollars. It is one of the most widely used methods of intrinsic valuation, and its result rests on a small set of assumptions about the future.
This article explains what a DCF computes, why it is used, its strengths and its limitations, and the 2 ways to calculate terminal value. It then works through a complete example on Philip Morris International using the Finapolis DCF.
A business is worth the present value of the cash it will generate for its owners over time, because a dollar received in the future is worth less than a dollar today.
The three inputs behind a DCF
The Finapolis DCF applies that idea to a company's financial statements. It loads 5 years of history, projects 5 years of future cash flow, and captures all the value beyond those years in a single terminal value. The result rests on 3 inputs.
- The projected cash flows. Revenue growth sets the path, and each cost line — margins, capital expenditure, working capital, and tax — follows as a share of revenue, based on its own history.
- The discount rate, or WACC. The rate that converts future cash into present value, set by the risk of the business and its cost of capital.
- The terminal value. What the business is worth at the end of the forecast. For most companies it is the largest piece of the answer.
Value per share = (PV of forecast FCFF + PV of terminal value - net debt) / shares outstanding
Absolute valuation, not a comparison
A DCF is a form of absolute valuation: it builds a value from a company's own projected cash flows, not by comparison with other companies.
Relative measures, such as the price-to-earnings (P/E) or EV/EBITDA multiple, show what a stock costs against its peers. They depend on those peers being priced fairly, so if a whole sector is mispriced, the multiple carries that mispricing with it. A DCF starts instead from the cash the business itself produces.
Why use a DCF, and where it falls short
The method has 3 commonly cited strengths.
- It forces every assumption to be stated, so growth, margins, the discount rate, and the terminal value can each be examined and challenged.
- It is transparent, because every output traces back to a specific input.
- And it values the business mainly from its cash flows rather than from peer pricing, which lets the result be compared against the market price.
A DCF works best for mature, stable, cash-generative companies, where the next few years are likely to look much like the last few.
A DCF has several well-documented limitations.
- The terminal value usually makes up most of the total, so the answer leans heavily on assumptions about the years beyond the forecast.
- The model is sensitive to the discount rate and the growth rate; that is sharpest under the perpetuity-growth method, where the two are subtracted in a small denominator, so a small change in either moves the value a lot.
- A DCF is also only as good as its inputs: a distortion in the starting cash flows, left unadjusted, carries through every forecast year.
- And because it produces a single, precise-looking figure, it can imply more certainty than the assumptions support.
- Finally, it fits poorly where the future is unlikely to resemble the past, such as highly cyclical companies near a peak or trough, early-stage companies without settled margins, or companies in the middle of a major change.
The two ways to calculate terminal value
Because the terminal value usually carries most of the estimate, the way it is calculated matters a great deal. There are 2 standard methods, and the Finapolis DCF supports both.
The exit-multiple method
The exit-multiple method values the business at the end of the forecast the way the market would, by applying a valuation multiple to a final-year figure, most often an EV/EBITDA multiple on year-5 EBITDA. In the Finapolis DCF the default multiple is the company's own current EV/EBITDA, with a fallback of 15.0x when no market multiple is available.
The appeal is that it is grounded in real market pricing, not a theoretical input. The drawback is that it carries today's pricing into the terminal year: anchoring to the current multiple assumes a similar multiple will hold 5 years out, which can fold today's valuation back into the estimate of intrinsic value.
The perpetuity-growth method
The perpetuity-growth method, also called the Gordon growth method, assumes the business keeps generating cash forever, growing at a constant rate. The terminal value is the final year's free cash flow, grown 1 year, divided by the discount rate minus that growth rate. The Finapolis default growth rate is 2.5%, roughly long-run inflation.
The appeal is that it is internally consistent and uses no market multiple. The drawback is mathematical: because the denominator is the discount rate minus the growth rate, the result swings sharply as the two get close, and the formula breaks down entirely once growth meets or exceeds the discount rate. A lower discount rate pushes the terminal value higher under this method.
In the Finapolis DCF the method is chosen on the Valuation tab. The 5Y Avg / Perpetuity scenario applies the perpetuity-growth method and eases revenue growth down toward the terminal rate by year 5.
A worked example: Philip Morris International
Philip Morris International (PM, Consumer Defensive / Tobacco) is a mature, cash-generative business with a fairly stable margin structure — the profile a DCF handles best. It traded at $180.77 on June 11, 2026, with a Finapolis fundamental grade of B, a health grade of PASS, and a 52-week range of $139.57 to $193.05.
Hold every input at the engine's base case and change only the growth assumption, and the fair value moves across this range:
| Growth assumption | Fair value | Against the $181 price |
|---|---|---|
| Worst 5-year stretch in PM's history | $142.53 | 21% below |
| Average of the last 5 years (default) | $244.53 | 35% above |
| Best 5-year stretch in PM's history | $258.45 | 43% above |
Growth is not the only assumption that moves the answer. Change the terminal method or the exit multiple and the same company, on the same day, ranges from about $111 to about $318 per share.
That spread, from $110.86 to $318.46, comes from the methods' differing inputs rather than from any error, and the 3 inputs below explain most of it.
One feature of Philip Morris matters first. The company reported negative book equity of about -$8.0 billion at the end of 2025, the result of its separation from Altria and years of share buybacks.
That is why return-on-equity and debt-to-equity are blank on the platform: there is no positive book equity to divide by. Book-value measures break down here, while a DCF still works, because it values the company's cash flows and enterprise value, not its accounting equity.
Free cash flow: levered vs unlevered (FCFF)
Free cash flow is the cash a business produces after operating costs, taxes, and capital expenditure. There are 2 versions, and the difference matters here.
- Levered free cash flow is the cash left for shareholders after interest is paid; it is roughly operating cash flow minus capital expenditure, and it is what the cash flow statement shows.
- Unlevered free cash flow, or free cash flow to the firm (FCFF), is the cash the business generates before any financing costs, so it belongs to lenders and shareholders together.
The Finapolis DCF values the firm on FCFF: it discounts FCFF at WACC to reach an enterprise value, then subtracts net debt to reach equity value. That is why the model's cash flows differ from the cash flow statement.
Reading the reported (levered) figure next to net income over 5 years helps spot years where something outside normal operations moved the result:
| Fiscal year | Net income | Reported free cash flow | FCF margin |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $9.1B | $11.2B | 35.7% |
| 2022 | $9.0B | $9.7B | 30.6% |
| 2023 | $7.8B | $7.9B | 22.4% |
| 2024 | $7.1B | $10.8B | 28.4% |
| 2025 | $11.3B | $10.7B | 26.2% |
Net income fell to $7.1 billion in 2024, the lowest of the 5 years, then rose to $11.3 billion in 2025. The 2024 dip came from a higher effective tax rate, near 30%, and rising interest costs, not from weaker operations; free cash flow that year was a healthy $10.8 billion.
Working capital also swings the cash line year to year, and 2022 carried the Swedish Match acquisition, about $15 billion of net cash out the door, which also added debt. None of these items says much about the cash the business will generate in 2027.
The Finapolis DCF does not project from any single reported year, and it does not project the levered figure above. It rebuilds FCFF from operating drivers: it starts from net operating profit after tax (NOPAT, operating profit taxed as if the company carried no debt), adds back depreciation and amortization, then subtracts capital expenditure and the change in working capital.
It applies the company's 5-year average margins, capital intensity, and a normalized tax rate to projected revenue, so one-off items like the 2024 tax rate never enter the forecast.
The first forecast year comes to about $12.2 billion of FCFF. That is above the $10.7 billion of levered free cash flow reported for 2025 for 2 reasons: FCFF is measured before financing costs, and the rebuild strips out one-off items. The 2 figures are different measures, not the same number adjusted. Checking the starting cash flows before projecting them is a standard first step.
To find a year affected by one-off items, open the Statements tab on the Analyzer and set the View toggle to YoY Change. A one-time charge or an unusual tax rate shows up as a large jump in an otherwise steady row.
The discount rate (WACC)
The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is the rate used to discount future cash flows to present value. The Finapolis DCF builds it from observable inputs.
For Philip Morris it is 5.46%, a low figure that reflects the company's low share-price volatility (a low beta) and a capital structure that is mostly equity by market value.
| Component | PM value | How it is computed |
|---|---|---|
| Equity weight | 85.3% | Market cap $282.6B / (market cap + total debt $48.8B) |
| Debt weight | 14.7% | Total debt / (market cap + total debt) |
| Cost of equity | ~5.8% | 5-year Treasury yield (live from FRED) + beta x the Kroll equity risk premium |
| Cost of debt, after tax | ~3.7% | 4.75% pre-tax x (1 - 23.0% tax rate) |
| WACC | 5.46% | 85.3% x 5.8% + 14.7% x 3.7% |
At 5.46%, a dollar of cash arriving in the final forecast year is worth about 78 cents today. A lower discount rate shrinks distant cash flows less, which pushes even more of the company's value into the terminal value.
Where the value sits: the terminal value
All the value beyond the 5-year forecast sits in the terminal value. Under the default method, that is year-5 EBITDA times an exit multiple, set by default to the company's current EV/EBITDA, which is 19.3x for Philip Morris.
Of the roughly $420 billion of estimated enterprise value, the terminal value is about 85%, and the 5 forecast years are the other 15%. That 85% is high. As a rule of thumb, 60% to 75% is normal; a share this large is a signal that a longer explicit forecast, beyond 5 years, would let more of the value come from modeled years rather than from one terminal assumption.
Hold every other input fixed and move only the exit multiple, and the estimate tracks like this. The range spans the values that matter: 14x is about where the estimate meets today's price, 19.3x is the default based on the company's own multiple, and 25x marks the high end:
| Exit multiple | Fair value | Against the current price |
|---|---|---|
| 14x | $181.25 | Roughly at price |
| 17x | $217.04 | 20% above |
| 19.3x (default) | $244.53 | 35% above |
| 22x | $276.69 | 53% above |
| 25x | $312.48 | 73% above |
Moving two inputs at once
The sweep above moves one input. Moving 2 at once shows the full surface — varying the discount rate and the exit multiple together, the same 2 inputs the platform's Sensitivity Chart steps through. The estimate stays above today's price across almost the whole grid, dropping to the price only in the lower-left corner, where the exit multiple falls toward 14x.
Over the full 2-point discount-rate range, from 4.46% to 6.46%, the default-multiple column moves about $20; over the multiple range, from 14x to 25x, each row moves about $130. For this company and these cash flows, the answer moves far more with the exit multiple than with the discount rate. Part of that is mechanical: under the exit-multiple method the terminal value is a fixed figure, so the discount rate only changes how much it is reduced to present value, while the multiple scales it directly. That is why the terminal method and multiple deserve the closest review.
The two terminal methods, side by side
The perpetuity-growth method can be shown the same way. Its terminal value is the final year's free cash flow, grown 1 year, divided by the discount rate minus the perpetual growth rate.
At a 5.46% discount rate and a 2.5% growth rate, the denominator is just 2.96%. A half-point change in the discount rate then swings the perpetuity terminal value by roughly 15 to 20%, with no change to any projected cash flow, and the value breaks down once growth meets or exceeds the discount rate.
On the platform, the 5Y Avg / Perpetuity scenario applies this method and eases revenue growth toward the 2.5% terminal rate by year 5. At the same 5.46% WACC it returns $318.46, against $244.53 under the default 19.3x exit multiple — a $74 difference that comes entirely from the choice of terminal method.
The 2 methods can be tied together with a standard cross-check: back the implied perpetuity growth rate out of the exit multiple. PM's 19.3x multiple sets a terminal value of $456,666M; against the same year-5 free cash flow and the 5.46% discount rate, that figure implies a perpetual growth rate of about 1.9%.
In other words, the 19.3x multiple is equivalent to assuming PM's cash flows grow at roughly 1.9% forever, below the 2.5% the perpetuity method assumes by default, which is exactly why the exit multiple gives the lower value. Reading the implied growth rate out of an exit multiple this way is the usual test of whether the multiple is reasonable: one that implies negative growth or a rate well above the economy is a sign the terminal assumption needs another look.
Running the model in reverse
The default DCF sits about 35% above the price, and the platform's peer-multiple target for Philip Morris, $110.86, sits about 39% below it. Rather than pick a side, the model can be run in reverse: hold 2 of the 3 inputs at the base case and solve for the value of the third that makes the DCF equal the $180.77 price. Each input answers a different question about what the price assumes.
- Move only the exit multiple, and the model reaches today's price at about 14x, against the 19.3x at which Philip Morris trades now. That 14x is close to where the wider tobacco sector trades, the same reference behind the platform's $110.86 peer-multiple target.
- Move only the discount rate, holding the 19.3x multiple fixed, and the model reaches the price at a WACC of about 12.3%. (This holds the terminal value fixed and simply discounts it harder, so read it as a sensitivity, not a real cost of capital.) That rate is more than double the 5.46% the engine builds from observable inputs, and well above what the company's low beta and equity-heavy balance sheet would support.
- Move only the growth path, and the price sits below the average-growth case ($244.53) and above the worst 5-year stretch in the company's history ($142.53), implying growth a little below PM's recent norm.
Of the 3 inputs, only the exit multiple reaches the price at a value that is itself ordinary, about 14x. So the gap between the default DCF and the price is mostly a disagreement about one thing: whether the company's terminal cash flows deserve its own current 19.3x multiple or something closer to the tobacco sector.
Per the Finapolis Reporter research report dated March 23, 2026, that multiple has risen as smoke-free products (IQOS, ZYN, and VEEV) have grown to about 41% of revenue at gross margins near 70%, while the closest listed peer, Altria, trades far cheaper. A DCF shows where the disagreement sits; it does not settle it.
The forecast build and the valuation bridge
The 3 inputs come together in the forecast build below: 5 projected years, with the drivers held at Philip Morris's 5-year historical averages (revenue growth 7.27%, EBIT margin 36.95%, tax rate 23.0%, depreciation and amortization 4.03% of revenue, capital expenditure 3.44% of revenue, change in net working capital 1.13% of revenue). All figures in $M.
| Line item ($M) | 2026E | 2027E | 2028E | 2029E | 2030E |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 43,601 | 46,769 | 50,167 | 53,812 | 57,722 |
| Revenue growth % | 7.27% | 7.27% | 7.27% | 7.27% | 7.27% |
| EBIT | 16,110 | 17,281 | 18,536 | 19,883 | 21,327 |
| EBIT margin % | 36.95% | 36.95% | 36.95% | 36.95% | 36.95% |
| Tax rate % | 23.0% | 23.0% | 23.0% | 23.0% | 23.0% |
| NOPAT | 12,406 | 13,307 | 14,274 | 15,311 | 16,424 |
| D&A | 1,759 | 1,887 | 2,024 | 2,171 | 2,329 |
| EBITDA | 17,869 | 19,168 | 20,560 | 22,054 | 23,656 |
| Capex | 1,500 | 1,609 | 1,726 | 1,851 | 1,986 |
| Change in NWC | 493 | 529 | 567 | 609 | 653 |
| Free cash flow to the firm | 12,172 | 13,056 | 14,005 | 15,022 | 16,114 |
| Discount factor | 0.9709 | 0.9206 | 0.8728 | 0.8276 | 0.7848 |
| Discounted FCFF (PV) | 11,817 | 12,020 | 12,224 | 12,433 | 12,646 |
Those discounted cash flows then bridge to a share price:
| Valuation bridge | $M |
|---|---|
| PV of 5-year FCFF (2026E to 2030E) | 61,139 |
| Terminal value (19.3x of 2030E EBITDA of 23,656) | 456,666 |
| PV of terminal value | 358,379 |
| Enterprise value | 419,518 |
| Less total debt | 48,835 |
| Plus cash | 4,872 |
| Implied equity value | 375,555 |
| Shares outstanding (diluted) | ~1,536 |
| Implied price per share | $244.53 |
Three notes on the bridge.
- First, total debt of $48,835M less cash of $4,872M is net debt of $43,963M, the figure in the implied-price formula at the start of this article.
- Second, the bridge is simplified: a complete one would also subtract minority interest, preferred stock, and any non-operating assets. Philip Morris has minority interests (about $500M of its 2025 earnings belonged to minority holders), so a fuller bridge would put the per-share figure a little lower.
- Third, the share count of about 1,536M is the diluted figure that reproduces the engine's $244.53; Philip Morris's reported diluted count is about 1.55B, a difference of under 2%.
Every projection cell is editable on the Valuation tab. The base case holds growth at 7.27%, but the inputs can be changed year by year, for example to fade growth toward a lower mature rate, or to load a known capital expenditure program into particular years.
The flat averages are a starting point, not a forecast, and the estimate gets better as the year-by-year inputs reflect what you actually expect.
The model can be explored directly on the platform. Open the Valuation tab on the Analyzer for any ticker, pick a scenario preset, and edit any driver cell inline (revenue growth, margins, capital expenditure, the terminal multiple, or beta).
The implied price, upside, and WACC update with each change, and each cell can be reverted with Ctrl+Z. You can save up to 3 named scenarios per ticker and export the full build to Excel with the XLSX button.
Before relying on a DCF result, open the Sensitivity Chart. It re-prices the model across 9 WACC rows and 7 terminal-value columns around the current inputs and highlights the active run, so you can read how many changes it takes for the estimate to cross today's price.
What a DCF is, and isn't
A DCF does not hand you a single right number for a company. It makes the assumptions behind a value explicit, so an argument about a business becomes an argument about specific inputs you can check.



